How to make butter out of guns : the Turkish case and the Greek bitter lesson by Doulos, Dimitrios et al.
European Research Studies Journal 
Volume XXIV, Issue 1, 2021   
                                                                                                              pp. 1055-1072 
How to Make Butter out of Guns:  
The Turkish Case and the Greek Bitter Lesson        
Submitted 06/11/20, 1st revision 22/12/20, 2nd revision 20/01/21, accepted 17/02/21 
   




Purpose: This paper aims at assessing the links between defence expenditure and the 
growth of the Greek and Turkish economies.  The issue appears to be of particular interest 
for Greece, given the increased defence priorities of today on the one hand, and the 
shortage of resources on the other.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Using NATO and SIPRI databases we construct a system 
of behavioural equations for both countries. We estimate the system using GMM to assess 
the extent to which the development of a domestic defence industrial base (DIB) will 
contribute to the growth of the economy, the reduction of unemployment via the spin-offs 
and the import substitution of defence equipment. 
Findings: The results indicate that unlike the positive impact of the Turkish defence 
industry on economic growth, the cost imposed on the Greek economy due to the negligible 
contribution of its defence industry is hard to bear in view of the recent geopolitical 
developments in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Practical Implications: Promoting a sound defence industrial base contributes to growth. If 
the industrial base is considerably defence-oriented, contributes to self-sufficiency, 
immediate response in cases of emergency and less dependence on foreign suppliers.  
Originality/Value: Unless Greece proceeds to an import-substitution policy regarding 
defence procurement, the increased requirements in view of the recent geopolitical 
developments will impose a prohibitive cost on the economy.  
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National defence is a public good and consequently almost all categories of 
military expenditure burden the government budget. In Greece most of the military 
equipment is imported. This is due to the defence industrial base lying almost idle 
for several decades because of different reasons ranging from political 
interventions with management issues to bureaucracy impediments leading to 
waste of resources. Consequently, the Greek defence industry is now seriously 
lagging that of Turkey, a country with which Greece has been entangled in an arms 
race. As a result, the former is now able to support more than half of the country’s 
defence requirements using domestic production. By contrast, Greece is compelled 
to import an overwhelming percentage of the defence equipment required with all 
multiple adverse repercussions that such a policy may entail on the security of the 
country, the availability of equipment in emergency cases, the balance of payments 
and the technology transfer. 
 
As mentioned in the next section, the issues of defense spending and the 
development of the DIB in Greece has grown to becoming a debate in the literature 
approached in the light of mainly two perspectives, i. e. the country’s recent poor 
economic performance and the escalating demands from the part of Turkey to 
revise the status-quo in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. During the 
Greek economic crisis, the European Commission (EC), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been insisting 
that defence procurement cuts must be a top priority4. This policy recommendation 
has been encouraged following the recent NATO summit, during which it has been 
pointed out that Greece is one of just five member countries that allocate 2% or 
more of their GDP to defence5. Considering the recent geopolitical developments 
and the fact that the Greek economy has been recovering - at least until the recent 
pandemic - the issue of an increase in defence spending has become more than 
pressing. The urgency of the matter is justified since all procurement programs of 
the Hellenic Armed Forces (EMPAE) have been cancelled or postponed during the 
crisis years. Such decisions solely based on economic grounds, however, endanger 
the effectiveness of the Hellenic Armed Forces in the recent volatile geopolitical 
environment. The result of these defense budget cuts has been the minimization of 
the contribution of the Hellenic Defence Industrial Base (DIB) to the EMPAE.  
 
Consequently, Greece is doomed to rely more and more on importing expensive 
defence equipment to support the EMPAE requirements. An alternative for Greece 
 
4 In fact, the IMF has repeatedly expressed in the past its concerns on the issue of 
“excessive defence spending” (IMF, 2010, 2012 and 2014). 
5This is a rather naïve approach concerning the issue of NATO members burden sharing, 
considering that in most cases about 70% of total defence spending reflects expenditure on 
personnel wages and salaries leaving only about 10 to 15% for equipment procurement. 
 
     Dimitrios Doulos, Odysseus Katsaitis, George A. Zombanaki    
 
 1057  
would be to proceed with an import-substitution policy concerning the production 
of selected defence equipment items for the Hellenic Armed Forces. This is an 
option encouraged by the findings in the literature. However, the importance of a 
Greek DIB has not been empirically assessed until now, despite the successful 
examples of neighboring countries like Turkey and Israel.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the contribution of such an industry on the 
performance of the economy. For this reason, we shall focus on the case of Turkey 
and Greece since the former’s DIB performance has had a positive impact on its 
economy while the two countries are involved in lengthy arms race. The paper 
proceeds as follows: the next section presents a brief literature review followed by 
an outline of the Greek and Turkish defence industrial bases. Section 4 describes 
the methodology used to assess the contribution of a Defence Industrial Base (DIB) 
on the two countries’ economic growth, while the next section presents the 
empirical results. Finally, section 6 deals with the policy implications before 
conclusions are drawn. 
   
2. Review of Literature 
 
The relevant literature offers a wide variety of definitions concerning the defence 
industrial base (DIB). The US Department of Defence e.g., defines DIB as the 
“Department of Defence, government and private sector worldwide industrial 
complex with capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce 
and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet 
military requirements”. (US DoD)6. By contrast, a more academic definition is 
proposed by Dunne, this being “a defence industrial base constitutes those 
companies which provide defence and defence related equipment to the defence 
ministry” (Dunne, 1995). 
 
The so-called “Benoit hypothesis” concludes that defence spending promotes 
economic growth (Benoit, 1978). One of the channels through which defence 
expenditure contributes to economic growth is the performance of a sound DIB. 
The functions of a national DIB have been widely discussed in the literature and 
the dominant view seems to be that “a national defence industrial base offers both 
military-strategic and wider economic and industrial benefits” (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995).  
 
In assessing the impact of a DIB on economic performance, research focuses either 
on groups of countries, or individual country cases. Sandler and Hartley (2007) 
attempt a parallel consideration of the NATO and EU defence markets. They point 
 
6Definition provided at: https://www.militaryfactory.com/dictionary/military-terms 
defined.asp?term_id=1554. Accessed on January 25th, 2020. 
 
 




out that defence industries have the features of an “economically strategic industry 
as they are characterized by decreasing per unit costs reflecting economies of scale 
and learning, high technology reflected in major and costly R&D, together with 
technical spillovers to the rest of the economy”. Concerning individual country 
studies, Dunne and Haines (2002) focus on the case of the South African DIB and 
mention a number of channels through which a DIB can affect the economy 
positively or negatively, such as supporting jobs, crowding out civil sector 
investment or spinning off technology to the civil sector. Kuah and Loo (2004) find 
that in the case of Singapore, the link between the defence industrial base and 
economic growth is not clear. On one hand, the domestic DIB has delivered what 
the theory postulates: job creation, human capital development together with 
technology development and diffusion. On the other hand, such benefits have come 
largely because of the spectacular growth of the Singapore economy.  
 
Umar and Bakar (2016) using an autoregressive distributed lag model, examine the 
short-run and long-run impact of arms importation on the economic growth in 
Nigeria. They recommend that defense R&D as well as Defense Industrial 
Cooperation of Nigeria should be properly financed and managed for efficiency 
and self-reliability. Broude et al. (2013) examine the link between defence 
spending in Israel, its domestic DIB and the leading role of R&D expenditure, 
concluding that the country’s “macroeconomy has not benefited from defence 
spending”. Dunne et al. (2007), focusing on the DIB development determinants, 
classify countries as producers and non-producers (importers) of defence 
equipment. They find that the extent to which a country will be an importer, or a 
domestic producer will depend on military spending, R&D costs, export controls 
and the nature of regional arms races.  
 
Given that Greece is a typical case of a country involved in an arms race (Andreou 
and Zombanakis, 2006),7 the economic impact of developing a sound DIB becomes 
an essential issue. In fact, Ploumis (2017) argues that the Hellenic DIB should be 
considered an integral part of the Greek national defence framework. 
Consequently, the ownership structure and management of major defence industrial 
enterprises should be reformed within the European framework. Furthermore, 
given that a sound DIB requires technology and skilled work force, the author 
suggests that Greek institutions of higher education should support this effort. A 
look at the Turkish case, the “partner” of Greece in their arms race, is enough to 
convince the reader on the contribution of a sound DIB to the economic growth of 
 
7 It has now been established in the literature that the Greek side is compelled to follow the 
Turkish defence procurement policy regardless its direction of change. It refers to earlier 
work on this issue (Andreou and Zombanakis, 2006) in which an arms race between the two 
sides has been established despite occasional objections (Brauer, 2002). The fact is, 
however, that. the defence potential of Turkey has risen despite its recent economic 
problems. By contrast, the ability of Greece to build up a reliable defence industrial base 
continues to erode even after the end of the crisis in an investment-hostile economic 
environment. 
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a country. It has been demonstrated repeatedly in the literature through a series of 
contributions starting with (Brauer, 2002) until recently,  Demir et al. (2016), 
Mevlutoglu (2017), Kurç (2017), that the Turkish defence industry is prospering 
supplying a substantial percentage of the country’s required defence material. In 
the case of Greece, however, since most of the defense equipment is imported, one 
cannot expect a positive impact on economic performance. On the contrary, 
according to Sezgin (2003) equipment defence spending entails adverse 
repercussions on the economic growth of Greece.  
 
3. A Glance on the Hellenic and the Turkish Defence Industries 
 
The Hellenic defence industry, except for one case (PYRCAL established in 1874) 
has been created mainly because of exogenous pressure applied after the 1974 
Greek – Turkish clash rather than following a long-term planning procedure. The 
reasoning behind establishing a domestic defence industry was to relieve the 
Hellenic Armed Forces from constraints like dependence on foreign suppliers, 
substantial delivery delays, spare part shortage and considerable foreign exchange 
outflows. During the 1970s, the Greek government encouraged both public and 
private funds to promote defence industry. As a result, several essential production 
units begun to form the defence infrastructure of the country. Since then, however, 
the performance of these firms has left a lot to be desired in terms of efficiency and 
support of the armed forces requirements. This has been mainly due to serious 
weaknesses like mismanagement, strong political involvement, absence of 
coordination with the EMPAE, and the reluctance of the country’s academic 
institutions to benefit from research and development (R&D) programmes as well 
as technology transfer. Such weaknesses introduced market distortions and lead to 
the disorientation of these industries from leading targets like profit – 
maximisation.  
 
As a result, the Hellenic DIB currently supports only a negligible percentage of the 
Hellenic Armed Forces equipment requirements (Brauer, 2002; ELIAMEP, 2007; 
Andreou et al., 2013). The situation seems to have deteriorated since the beginning 
of the economic crisis, with the reduction of the resources allocated to defence 
projects, the absence of specialized technical and administrative personnel, as well 
as the restrictions imposed on the use of patents and the technical production 
documents (TPD) owned by the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) 
(Andreou et al., 2013). This environment is certainly inadequate to contribute to 
the maintenance and support of the Hellenic Armed Forces equipment8 and has 
inevitably compelled the Hellenic Armed Forces to resort to extensive expenditure 
 
8 A notable exception in this environment of inadequacy seems to be the Hellenic Aerospace 
Industry (HAI), which supports the depot – level maintenance (DLM) of the entire fleet of 
flying NATO Radar. The recent history of the HAI cooperation with NATO involves 279 
maintenance and 750 units of engines components. 
 




on imports of equipment that can guarantee their readiness. This means that the 
defence of the country continues to rely heavily on foreign suppliers, while such an 
environment hardly contributes to the country’s economic growth, unemployment 
containment and balance of payments sustainability.  
 
In fact, this is the point that this paper aims at tackling i.e., the extent to which 
placing emphasis on domestic production rather than imports of defence equipment 
is expected to contribute to the benefit of the Greek economy in more than one 
way. Indeed, we argue that the more the government opts for promoting 
procurement from domestic sources at the expense of imports, the more it 
contributes to growth and employment. It also relieves the balance of payments 
from its sustainability constraint, given that in such a case the payments involved 
are not recorded in the external trade flows of the country according to the resident 
– non-resident criterion (IMF, 2009). Finally, yet importantly, such a policy is 
expected to contribute to the integration of the Greek industrial complex to the 
European industry with all the benefits that the resulting technology transfer may 
entail in such cases. 
 
Contrary to the case of Greece, Turkey embarked in the process of building up a 
sound DIB as early as in 1920s, following the setup of the General Directorate of 
Military Facilities and the establishment of a group of repair facilities for weapons 
and ammunition, aiming at supporting the needs of the national ground armed 
forces. The naval dimension was introduced with the setup of the Gölcük Shipyard 
a few years later and subsequently followed by the Turkish aviation industry 
established in 1926. Again, unlike Greece in the case of which the Cyprus crisis 
was a beginning of simply changing defence equipment imports from the US to 
Europe, Turkey regarded the arms embargo imposed on her as the need to promote 
its national defence industry in order to avoid its dependence on foreign supply, 
resorting to import substitution (Durmaz, 2014).  
 
Thus, under the auspices of the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSM) has 
proceeded with modernizing the industry aiming at technology transfer and export 
promotion. Concerning the first target, this seems to have been attained to a 
considerable extent (Gumus et al., 2009). Regarding export promotion, however, 
current export figures do not promise a significant growth in the near future 
(Mevlutoglu, 2017). As the author points out, further increase in export sales “will 
only be possible through more emphasis on R&D, innovation, and sound business 
development strategies”. Despite such problems, however, the Turkish defence 
industry supports a considerable percentage of the national armed forces 
requirements, thus contributing to the growth of the economy9.  
 
 
9 Côrte Réal-Pinto Anouck Gabriela. (2017). A Neo-Liberal Exception? The Defence 
Industry ‘Turkification’ Project. Revue internationale de politique de développement. 8. 
10.4000/poldev.2316. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
The data covers the period 1970-2019. Following Broude et al. (2013), we tend to 
agree that “the impact of the military on the economy is best modelled in terms of a 
simultaneous equation model (SEM), which in turn should reflect the predominant 
structural characteristics of the economy”10. We thus, use a simultaneous equation 
system (SES) consisting of three equations for each of the two countries that 
explain GDP growth, government spending and defence expenditures designed to 
underline the links between defence spending and economic growth. In fact, what 
we seek to show is that contrary to the point made by Aizenman and Glick (2006) 
and unlike the case of Turkey, defence spending exerts a negative impact on the 
Greek economic growth in the presence of threat given that the majority of the 
defence equipment used is imported11.  
 
The reformulation of the Barro (1990) model used by Aizenman and Glick (2006), 
which allows for security effects on output seems potentially more promising. 
Security is measured by military expenditure relative to the threat and this produces 
a non-linear effect of military expenditure. Military expenditure has a positive 
effect on output when the threat is high and a negative effect when threat is low. In 
refining growth models to allow for such non-linearities, defence economists have 
a comparative advantage since in estimating demand for military expenditure 
functions they have obtained considerable experience in measuring threats and 
other factors that influence military expenditures. Thus, there is a theoretical as 
well as an econometric reason for estimating simultaneous systems that explain 
both military expenditures and output (Dunne et al., 2005). 
 
The use of a SES rather than a single growth equation solves the problem of 
simultaneity bias since growth, investment and defence spending tend to be 
determined simultaneously. As Broude et al. (2013) point out, this framework 
“accounts for both demand and supply side factors whereby the military sector is 
not only an input into the production function but also creates aggregate demand 
and thus induces the underemployed economy towards its production possibility 
frontier”.  
 
As the paper focuses on the defence sector of the two countries, this issue requires 
special emphasis. Since defence expenditure affects growth through a variety of 
channels a structural model should be able to capture some of them (Deger and 
Sen, 1995). Such channels are the resource allocation effect by which an increase 
 
10 Such models may be quite elaborate, but data availability predicates that we keep these 
models relatively simple. 
11 The Aizenman and Glick (2006) model suggests that military expenditure induced by 
external threats should increase output, by increasing security; while military expenditure 
induced by rent seeking and corruption should reduce growth, by displacing productive 
activities. The empirical results later in our paper underline the validity of this argument. 




in defence may crowd out investment or increases in other forms of government 
expenditures, which in turn may reduce national savings. Thus, defence 
expenditure is shown to affect the remaining public spending items, which, in their 
turn, determine the growth of the economy. The demand for defence expenditure 
function follows the well-established theoretical background (Smith 1980 and 
1989) with the defence spending on equipment added to the determinants. This 
modification has proven to be successful (Bragoudakis and Zombanakis, 2017; 
Katsaitis et al., 2019) for several reasons: First, it avoids double counting in cases 
in which variables representing the total national budget are included in the 
model12. The second reason is that focusing on the defence equipment emphasizes 
on the technical progress embodied in it and the ensuing stimulating effects on 
private investment in R&D (Kennedy, 1987; Herrera and Gentilucci, 2013). The 
fact that in the case of Greece the bulk of the defence equipment is imported using 
the specific variable underlines the failure to profit from such technological 
benefits. The model is given as follows:  
 
  (1) 
        (2)  
                                   (3) 
(4) 
          (5) 
        (6) 
 
where:  DY is GDP growth while GS stands for total government spending. DEF 
represents defence spending, GK gross capital formation and SS savings. EQDEF 
stands for defence spending on equipment and POP denotes population growth. 
Finally, the DEF variable of Greece or Turkey represents the threat to the arms race 
“partner’s” defence spending in equations (6) and (3) respectively, while SP stands 
for the NATO defence spending spillover benefits because of each country’s 
NATO membership. GS, DEF, GK, SS and EQDEF are measured as percentages of 
GDP. The prefix G or T denotes whether the variable refers to Greece or Turkey, 
respectively. All variable sources are presented in Table A2, in the Appendix. 
 
Equations (1) and (4) describe GDP growth, equations (2) and (5) non-defense 
government spending and equations (3) and (6) constitute a modified typical 
demand for defence expenditure equation. More specifically, the growth and 
government spending equations (1), (2), (4) and (5) follow Ram (1995) and Deger 
and Sen (1995). Savings and non-defence government spending determine 
 
12More specifically, the defence expenditure for salaries and pensions of the military and 
civilian personnel are included in both the total defence spending figures and the state 
budget. Thus, substituting defence spending on equipment for the total defence spending 
avoids such double counting issues. For similar problems refer to Torres (2020). 
 
     Dimitrios Doulos, Odysseus Katsaitis, George A. Zombanaki    
 
 1063  
economic growth, while non-defence government spending is a function of defence 
expenditure, gross capital formation and population growth. The defence 
expenditure equations (3) and (6) rely heavily on the latest developments 
concerning Greek – Turkish relations and use the standard explanatory variables. 
The pronounced presence of defence expenditure in the growth and government 
spending equations is justified by the fact that national security (as this is 
approximated by defence expenditure) is a public good. The focus of this paper, 
however, requires that we treat defence spending on equipment as a distinct 
variable to underline its adverse effect on the GDP growth in cases in which the 
Armed Forces requirements are met by importables. Finally, equations (2) and (5) 
which determine the non-defence government spending in both countries use a 
dummy variable each to capture the effect of the crisis years in the case of Greece 
and the return to constitutional law in the case of Turkey, following the 1980 
military coup.  
 
As far as the signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are concerned, 
we expect non-defence government expenditure, gross investment, and savings to 
contribute to growth thus bearing a positive sign. By contrast, to the extent that 
defence spending on equipment represents importable, it brings about a negative 
influence on the rate of growth. Furthermore, we expect the total defence spending 
crowds out the non-defense component of government expenditures and therefore 
exhibit a negative relationship to it, unlike the population growth, which usually 
demands an increase in government spending. Finally, all arguments of the demand 
for defence spending equation are expected to have a positive sign (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995).    
 
Given the formulation of the system above, endogeneity may clearly be an issue, 
thus the model is estimated using General Method of Moments (GMM). The major 
advantage of GMM is that its estimates can be robust to heteroscedasticity and 
distributional assumptions (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). The system is estimated 
using the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance-covariance matrix 
of Newy-West. As instruments, we use the demeaned variables squared lagged 
once and the product of the variables taken two at a time. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 presents the GMM coefficient estimates. They are all highly significant 
given their t–statistics and bear the expected signs. An extra dividend of using the 
GMM is the J–statistic, i.e., the value of the objective function times the number of 
observations.  The J statistic is distributed as a X2 distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of parameters.  The 
J statistic provides us with an encompassing test for testing the validity / no 
misspecification of the model.  The value of the J statistic for this model is 0.98, 
thus the hypothesis of misspecification can be rejected at any reasonable level of 




confidence.  Furthermore, the residuals do not exhibit any autocorrelation (See 
Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Given the importance of our results for designing and assessing economic policy, 
we utilize an extra test to assess whether our estimates are, at least, consistent. We 
estimate the model using 3SLS. The estimates are in principle consistent, however, 
relatively inefficient compared to GMM. Table A3 in the Appendix presents the 
parameter estimates for the 3SLS.  As expected, they are close to the ones obtained 
by GMM, but standard errors are larger.   
 
Turning to discussing the values derived for the coefficients in focus and bearing in 
mind that the scope of the paper is to trace the link between defence expenditure 
and the GDP growth in both countries, we start with equations (3) and (6) in which 
the expenditure on defense equipment increases the total defence spending of each 
country as expected. The corresponding arc elasticities derived for the determinants 
of defense expenditure (Table 2) are to a large extent within the range of those 
reported in the literature (Brauer 2002). Equations (2) and (5) show how the rise of 
defence spending following increased defence payments crowds out non-defence 
government expenditure due to the imposed fiscal constraint. In the Greek case, 
given the positive relation between non-defence government spending and the GDP 
growth in equation (1) what is expected is a consequent reduction of the growth 
rate, which traces back to the effect brought about due to the imports of defence 
equipment. 
 
It is interesting to observe, in this case, that in both countries the impact exercised 
by defence equipment procurement is imposed on the GDP growth via two 
channels. The first is the impact exercised following the reasoning just described 
and the second is the “direct” adverse effect, as imports of defence equipment enter 
equations (1) and (4) directly with a negative sign13. This is a reasoning suggested 
 
13 As earlier pointed out, the Aizenman and Glick (2006) conclusion seems to fit the case of 
Greece, a country facing external threats. Thus, while Greek output should be expected to 
increase via military expenditure, the results derived point to a negative effect of the 
defence spending on growth due to the prevailing corrupt environment with several related 
cases brought to justice and a number of high officials imprisoned. Despite recent efforts to 
privatisation aiming at improving the efficiency of a certain number of firms, the fact 
remains that the Hellenic defence industrial base as it stands can only meet a small 
percentage, possibly around 10% of the country’s procurement needs in value terms as 
these are expressed in the medium and long term EMPAE while the rest is imported 
(ELIAMEP, 2007). This means that the defence of the country continues to rely heavily on 
foreign suppliers whose local agents are most happy to collect their commission fees for 
promoting business mainly via the so called “military offsets”, the value of which in some 
cases may even exceed 100% of that representing the initial agreement. It appears, 
however, that the use of such offsets is far from being fruitful for the Greek side, given that 
the legal framework underlying their application is full of “grey areas” leaving ample 
room for personal interpretation (ELIAMEP, 2007). 
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by Yakovlev (2007) indicating that “if a country hopes to lose less in economic 
growth from an additional military spending, it better be a net arms exporter”. This 
finding stresses the problem faced by Greece, a country that, unlike Turkey, is far 
from being an arms exporter! Needless to point out that defence equipment 
procurement enters the growth equations of both countries with a four-year time 
lag to account for the usual revisions of the medium-term procurement programs in 
each of the two countries. 
 
As expected, the inverse relationship between defence spending on equipment and 
growth holds in the case of Turkey as well as shown in equation (4). However, 
unlike the case of Greece in which non-defence government expenditure exercises 
a positive effect on growth, this is not the case with Turkey. This is a finding, 
which must be considered in connection to the fact that the government size and 
consequently government spending in Turkey is too high and that the economy 
may grow at a faster rate to the extent that it can be relieved of some of the 
government burden (Mitchell, 2005).  
 
6. Policy Implications  
 
Solving the system of equations (1) to (6) for the six endogenous variables for both 
countries and with the help of the arc elasticities recorded in Table 2, one can reach 
a number of interesting policy implications and conclusions concerning the role of 
the domestic defence industrial base in the two countries. The first finding concerns 
the direct impact of the defence equipment procurement on the growth rate of both 
countries as this appears in equations (1) and (4) which is negative in both cases, 
meaning that defence equipment purchases exert an adverse impact on both 
countries’ GDP. This is a finding which should be expected given that defence 
spending on equipment is to a large extent imported and consequently deprived the 
economy of valuable resources. The difference lies with the fact that in the Greek 
case the response of the growth rate to defence equipment purchases reveals an 
elastic behaviour as opposed to an inelastic one in the Turkish case.14 Again, this is 
expected, given that about 70% of the Turkish defence equipment requirements are 
domestically produced15, while in the case of Greece tis percentage has always 
been a one-digit figure.  
 
The second finding traces the indirect impact of spending on defence equipment on 
the growth rate of the two countries. Following a chain reaction, (equations 1 to 3 
 
 
14 The arc elasticities of growth with respect to defense spending on equipment, shown in 
Table 2, were estimated based on the coefficients derived from the solution of the system. 








for Greece and 4 to 6 for Turkey) the defence equipment procurement increases the 
total defence spending and this, in its turn, crowds out non-defence public spending 
in both countries, something which affects their rate of growth. It is interesting to 
observe, however, that while in both countries, the indirect impact of defence 
equipment purchases on their growth rate is inelastic, in the case of Greece this 
impact is adverse while this is not so in the case of Turkey in which the final 
impact is positive. 
 
Turning to the essence of the paper, which is the assessment of the equipment 
procurement impact on the economic growth of Greece and Turkey, we shall 
embark on a straightforward exercise based on the GMM solution of the model and 
the coefficient estimates derived. This exercise concerns the requirements of the 
Greek armed forces16 in view of the Greek-Turkish arms race and the increasing 
pressure exercised by Turkey for “lebensraum” in the Aegean and East 
Mediterranean:  
 
As things stand now, Greece spends a rough 2.5% of its GDP to its defence needs, 
including wages, salaries, and pensions of the military and civilian personnel. 
Given that the Greek GDP is in the range of €200 bill, the sum devoted to total 
defence spending will be about €5 bill. Out of this only about 10%, that is €500 
mil. will be channelled to defence equipment procurement, most of which will be 
imported, given the poor performance of the Hellenic DIB17. Such levels of defence 
expenditure are obviously inadequate to finance the programmes aiming at 
replacing at least some of the old Standard - type frigates of the Hellenic Navy, 
designed to patrol in the wider East Mediterranean.  
 
What Greece needs to start with, therefore, is to increase the equipment defence 
spending to about €1 bill per year as recent research points out (Katsaitis and 
Zombanakis, 2020). In fact, the Hellenic Navy will need two frigates to be 
employed in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the Hellenic Air Force will require 
substantial reinforcement.18. The cost of both programmes exceeds €4 billion which 
if distributed evenly throughout the next four-year procurement programme will 
mean that the “bill” devoted to defence procurement for next year will be of the 
order of €1 billion, i.e., double that for the current year in absolute 
 
16 Prime Minister’s speech< Thessaloniki, October, 2020 
17 To show the extent to which this is a sum far from being adequate to cover just the urgent 
operational needs of the Hellenic Armed Forces one needs to bear in mind that 30% of this 
amount, i. e. €150 mill, will be devoted to buying Seehecht torpedoes for the new T-214 
submarines. The remaining €350 mill is demonstrably inadequate to finance the purchase 
of a Belh@rra frigate for the Hellenic Navy!    
18 The contract for the procurement of 18 Rafales has been signed in January 2021 between 
France and Greece while an extensive F-16 modernization programme to the Viper version 
is already under way. (Greek Parliament, January 13, 2021).  
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figures19.According to the model used, the options that Greece faces range from 
either importing the entire defence equipment, or, alternatively, to producing some 
of it domestically, to the best possible extent. Given the elasticities in Table 2 the 
first option is prohibitive due to the enormous cost that it entails in terms of GDP 
growth rate. By contrast, restricting imports to the extent that import substitution 
policies allow, and embarking on producing the remaining items at home is 
expected to result to a minor GDP rate reduction, a much more interesting option, 
as domestic defence production is anticipated to contribute to GDP growth. The 
problem lies with the fact that, due to the inadequacy of the Greek DIB to engage 
in contracts involving high R&D content the import substitution extent will be 
limited. 
 
The situation in the case of Turkey, on the other hand, is by far better as shown in 
Table 2. For reasons of comparison, we shall assume that the defence spending on 
equipment procured will double, as in the case of Greece. Again, considering the 
elasticities of Table 2 there will be a direct adverse impact on the GDP growth rate 
to the extent that defence procurement is based on imports. Thus, the burden on the 
Turkish GDP growth rate is expected to suffer a slight decline as opposed to a 
prohibitive burden in the case of Greece, given that, as earlier pointed out, only 
high technology components are imported while most of the Turkish defence 
requirements are domestically produced. This means that a shift to emphasize on 
the domestic defence industrial base, by contrast, not only will avoid a GDP 
decline but, instead, it is expected to bring about a modest increase of the rate of 
GDP growth as shown by solving the system of equations 4 to 6.  Thus, thanks to 
the extensive development of the Turkish DIB, the impact on the growth rate of an 





Our paper aims at assessing the impact of alternative procurement policies on the 
Greek and Turkish growth rate: Imports versus domestic production. As expected, 
the adverse impact on the growth rate in both countries increases the more defence 
procurement relies on imports. In cases in which import substitution tactics are 
followed, such an adverse impact is much more tolerable. The extent to which this 
is the case depends on the development of the DIB in the two countries involved. 
 
Focusing on the case of Greece, relying heavily on defence equipment imports is 
an option that the Greek economy recovering from a lengthy economic crisis and 
currently facing the COVID-19 pandemic cannot afford. These circumstances 
 
19 These calculations do not include the impact on the GDP following the COVID-19 virus 
pandemic which is expected to make things much worse in terms of defence burden on the 
GDP. 
 




provide policymakers the opportunity to learn from mistakes made in the past and 
to consider revising their priorities. In fact, the coincidence of the COVID-19 
pandemic, together with the urgent needs for modern defence equipment in view of 
the instability in the Aegean and the Mediterranean dictate the following bitter 
lesson: Basing growth solely on services, boasting that “tourism is the heavy 
industry of our economy” is a blunder due to the high volatility of services receipts. 
By contrast, promoting a sound industrial base makes the economy much less 
vulnerable to external, unpredictable shocks. So much more if the industrial base is 
considerably defence-oriented, being an “economically strategic industry 
characterized by decreasing per unit costs reflecting economies of scale and 
learning, high technology reflected in major and costly R&D, together with 
technical spillovers to the rest of the economy” (Sandler and Hartley, 2007). Apart 
from such purely economic benefits, emphasis on a domestic DIB would lead to 
self-sufficiency, immediate response in cases of emergency or even war and less 
dependence on foreign suppliers. It is certain that the Greek political nexus regrets 
its negligence to build a sound Hellenic defence industrial base in view of the 
volatile geopolitical environment faced today. This blunder has now compelled the 
country to embark on endless negotiations to lease frigates that should be ready and 
operational by now, to support the country’s interests in the Aegean and the 





Table A1. System Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations GMM  
      
      
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. Df 
      
      1 48.75733 0.0761 49.89122 0.0617 36 
2 80.26516 0.2360 82.89942 0.1785 72 
3 105.9541 0.5377 110.4680 0.4161 108 
4 138.1639 0.6214 145.8988 0.4401 144 
5 182.1910 0.4403 195.5704 0.2024 180 
6 218.8866 0.4324 238.0600 0.1448 216 
7 256.9766 0.4013 283.3562 0.0850 252 
8 288.5630 0.4796 321.9619 0.0822 288 
9 311.8834 0.6757 351.2789 0.1425 324 
10 329.2090 0.8764 373.7003 0.2984 360 
11 353.2183 0.9400 405.7128 0.3572 396 
12 377.9037 0.9713 439.6551 0.3891 432 
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Table A2. Variable Sources* 
Total government spending 
 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Gross savings 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Gross Capital Formation 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Defence Spending on 
Equipment 
Defense spending on equipment, NATO data base 
Total Defence Spending Total defense spending NATO data base 
Population Growth World bank database 
GDP growth FRED 
NATO defence spending NATO data base 
Note: *Adding a prefix of G or T to the variable names above shows reference to Greece or 
Turkey respectively. 
Source: Own study. 
 
 
Table A3. 3SLS Coefficient Estimates 
Equation Nr. & 
Determinants  

















GGS-GDEF 0.14 2.03 TGS-TDEF  - 0.87 -3.32 
GGK 0.49 5.06 TGK  - 1.64 -4.36 
GSS 0.81 2.89 TSS 2.36 5.94 
GEQDEF(-4) - 5.53 -3.18 TEQDEF(-4) - 2.13 -1.51 
(2)(GGS-GDEF)   
(5)(TGS-
TDEF)   
GDEF - 8.91 -10.17 TDEF  - 0.91 -3.02 
GGK(-1) - 0.72 -6.67       
GPOP 9.43 4.56 TPOPT 
9.94*e-
0.8 5.86 
(3)  (GDEF)   (6) (TDEF)   
GEQDEF 1.71 2.33 TEQDEF  1.00 5.37 
TDEF 0.14 1.37 GDEF  0.42 4.55 
SP(-1) 0.13 1.93 SP(-4) -0.02 -0.33 
GDEF(-1) 0.65 5.86 TDEF(-1) 0.32 2.80 
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Table 1. GMM Coefficient Estimates 
Equation Nr. & 
Determinants  
Greece Equation Nr. & 
Determinants 
Turkey 
(1) (GDY) Coefficient 
t -
statistic 
(4) (TDY) Coefficient t -
statistic 
GGS-GDEF 0.17 12.15 TGS-TDEF  - 0.34 -6.64 
GGK 0.45 21.67 TGK  -0.81 -9.17 
GSS 0.96 16.37 TSS 1.18 11.77 
GEQDEF(-4) - 4.16 -9.76 TEQDEF(-4) - 3.50 -8.92 
(2) (GGS-
GDEF)   (5) (TGS-TDEF)   
GDEF - 8.35 -56.93 TDEF  - 1.43 -30.17 
GGK(-1) - 0.86 -26.10    
GPOP 9.37 21.48 TPOPT 6.92*e-0.8 22.93 
(3) (GDEF)   (6) (TDEF)   
GEQDEF 0.68 14.06 TEQDEF  0.98 21.39 
TDEF 0.05 3.32 GDEF 0.34 18.07 
SP(-1) 0.07 5.34 SP(-4) -0.02 -1.72 
GDEF(-1) 0.79 47.45 TDEF(-1) 0.42 14.47 































Table 2. Impact on the Growth Rate of a 100% Increase of Defence Equipment 
Purchases* 
Equations Elasticity 
 Greece Turkey 
Direct Impact due 
to EQDEF 
(Equations 1 and 4) 
-1.00 - 0.13 
Indirect Impact -0.03 +0.04 
Note: *Adding a prefix of G or T to the variable names above shows reference to Greece or 
Turkey, respectively. The underlying assumption for the calculations is that the import 
component of the defence procurement EQDEF is 90% for Greece and 30% for Turkey. 
Source: Own study. 
 
